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Abstract Plural definite descriptions (e.g. the things on the plate) and free relative
clauses (e.g. what is on the plate) have been argued to share the same semantic prop-
erties, despite their syntactic differences: both are non-quantificational expressions
referring to the maximal element of a given set (e.g. the set of things on the plate).
Experimental support for this semantic analysis is provided by the first investigation
ever of children’s interpretation of both constructions. A Truth-Value Judgment task,
an Act-Out task, and a corpus study of children’s linguistic input show that children
are aware that the two constructions are different from quantificational nominals
(e.g. all the things on the plate, some of the things on the plate) very early on (4
years old), despite the major difference in frequency in the input. Children acquire
the adult interpretation of both constructions at the very same time, around 6-7 years
old. We suggest that this relative delay depends on children’s difficulties with the
concept of the maximal element of a set or its association with specific linguistic
constructions.
Keywords: free relative clauses, plural definite descriptions, maximality, acquisition, exper-
imental, Act-Out task, Truth-Value Judgment task, corpus analysis
1 Introduction
If there are six cookies in a box and nothing else, adult English speakers judge both
sentences (1) and (2) true. The very same sentences are judged false in a situation in
which there are only marbles in the box. If the box contains three marbles and three
cookies, then (1) and (2) are either false or infelicitous/awkward.
(1) [The things in the box] are edible.
∗ We would like to thank Jennifer Audet, the audience at SALT 2010, the members of SemBabble at
UCSD, and the members of LadLab at UCSD.
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(2) [What is in the box] is edible.
More generally, sentences (1) and (2) have the same felicity/truth-conditions1,
even though they differ syntactically in their bracketed subject constituents. In (1),
the bracketed subject is a plural definite description (PDD), i.e., a nominal expression
introduced by the (syntactically a DP with the determiner the as its D head and an NP
as its complement2). In (2), however, the bracketed subject is a free relative clause
(FR), i.e., a clause introduced by a wh-word that is not interpreted as a question
(syntactically a non-interrogative embedded wh-CP3).
In the past forty years, the semantic properties of PDDs have been carefully
described and several accounts have been suggested. Though different in the details,
all the accounts agree on at least two main properties of PDDs. First, a PDD is
referential rather than quantificational. In other words, a PDD semantically behaves
more like a proper name in referring to a specific object rather than quantifying
over a set of objects in the way quantified nominals like every cookie or all the
cookies do4. Second, a PDD does not refer to any random object in a given set,
but only to the (formally definable unique) maximal element of that set. Different
specific proposals may vary on the nature of the maximal object a PDD refers to: a
(possibly plural) maximal individual out of a set of (atomic and plural) individuals
or a maximal set of individuals out of a set of sets of individuals5.
The very same semantic approach has then been extended to FRs6. Thus, both
PDDs and FRs have been analyzed as referential expressions “triggering maximality”
(i.e., referring to the maximal element of a given set). However, the two constructions
1 We are abstracting away from the case in which there is only one object in the box. In such case,
sentence (1) feels awkward, since the plural definite description seem to license the inference (a
presupposition? an implicature?) that there must be more than one thing in the box. On the other
hand, sentence (2) feels fully acceptable in this situation as well. The difference may be related to the
fact that in English definite descriptions can be syntactically singular or plural, while free relatives
are always syntactically singular, even when they are semantically plural, i.e., they refer to a plural
individual.
2 More articulated internal structures have been suggested for PDDs. See Bernstein 2003 and Longob-
ardi 2003 for an overview of DPs, their internal structures, and supporting evidence.
3 See van Riemsdijk 2005 for a thorough survey.
4 See Löbner 2000: 233-234, 251-253 and references therein for a discussion of the non-quantificational
nature of PDDs and definite descriptions in general.
5 See Abbott 2010 for an accessible overview of the main facts and proposals about definiteness and
definite descriptions in general and PDDs in particular; Schwarzschild 1996 and Landman 2000 for
more technical presentations of the issues about PDDs and for specific proposals according to which
PDDs refer to maximal sets of individuals rather than maximal individuals; Link 1983 for the fully
detailed version of the specific semantic analysis of PDDs we are adopting according to which PDDs
refer to maximal individuals rather than maximal sets.
6 See Jacobson’s 1995 seminal work and, among others, Rullmann 1995, Dayal 1996, and Caponigro
2003, 2004).
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differ in their syntax – as briefly sketched above – and therefore in their syntax-
semantics mapping, as well. Maximality in PDDs is usually considered to be
triggered overtly by the determiner the (e.g., Link 1983). Maximality in FRs,
instead, has been argued not to be due to any overt lexical item, but to result from
the set of type-shifting operations that have been invoked for (bare) nominals7, with
a silent operator, sister of the CP of the FR, acting as the trigger of the shifting
(Caponigro 2003, 2004).
Left uncertain by such analyses is whether these two expressions of maximality
are attributable to a common semantic operator – overtly expressed in the first
case, and covertly in the second – or whether the two operators are represented
by distinct mental types (i.e., are psychologically distinct). These two alternative
representational accounts are difficult to distinguish on the basis of descriptive
adequacy. However, they make different predictions for language acquisition, the
focus of the present study. Here we explore the course of PDD and FR acquisition in
4- to 7-year-old children, and argue that the developmental data lend support to the
idea that PDDs and FRs have a common semantic representation.
Although PDDs and FRs have ostensibly similar interpretations, they differ
substantially both in their form, and, as we will show, their frequency in language
input to children. Given these grammatical and distributional differences, we might
expect corresponding differences in the rate at which children acquire each type
of expression. For example, we might expect that children interpret PDDs – e.g.,
the things on the plate – as maximal earlier than for FRs – e.g., what’s on the
plate. Another possibility, consistent with the hypothesis that these expressions
share a common semantic representation, is that PDDs and FRs emerge in synchrony
despite their surface differences. Although either semantic account could explain a
non-synchronous emergence of PDDs and FRs in acquisition – due to differences in
frequency, syntactic complexity, etc. – a synchronized emergence would be most
naturally explained by the hypothesis that both forms depend on a common semantic
operator, whose emergence permits both forms to be acquired.
Previous acquisition studies (Munn, Miller & Schmitt (2006) for PDDs and
Modyanova & Wexler (2008) for FRs) have not yet established when children acquire
adult-like interpretations of these forms, or how they are related in acquisition. Also,
previous studies have used different methods to investigate the acquisition of PDDs
and FRs, making it difficult to compare previous results.
We assess children’s understanding of both constructions using the same set of
tasks to test the hypothesis that (i) PDDs and FRs are mapped onto the same meaning,
(ii) the meaning they are mapped onto is the maximal element of a given set, and
(iii) that these meanings emerge at the same time in acquisition. We also investigate
7 See Partee 1986, Chierchia 1998, and Dayal 2004, among others.
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the frequency of both forms in child-directed speech. Our findings show that from
very early on children treat the two constructions as semantically equivalent, but as
semantically different from quantificational nominals.
We also find that children map both PDDs and FRs onto maximal elements at
around the same time, but do so relatively late (when they are 6 to 7 years old). These
results are particularly interesting given our analysis of child-directed speech, which
finds that PDDs and FRs differ massively in their frequency in children’s input.
Together, our findings support the hypothesis that a common semantic mechanism
supports children’s maximal interpretations of both PDDs and FRs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews previous related ac-
quisition studies. Section 3 presents and discusses the results of our two experiments
on the acquisition of PDDs and FRs: a Truth-Value Judgment task and an Act-Out
task. Section 4 presents and discusses the findings of our corpus study in which we
look at child-directed speech containing PDDs and FRs. Section 5 concludes with
some general remarks and open issues.
2 Previous acquisition studies
In this section, we briefly review the few previous studies about children’s interpre-
tation of PDDs and FRs. We are aware of only one study of PDDs and another one
regarding FRs. We discuss them in turn below.
Munn et al. (2006) investigate the acquisition of PDDs together with singular
definite descriptions and indefinite DPs in English and Spanish by means of an
Act-Out task. To test the interpretation of English PDDs, they tested 15 children
(aged 3;0 to 5;5, mean 4;1) and presented scenarios with toys such as one where
three frogs are next to a barn and three frogs are next to a house. They then uttered
the following request (where the PDD is italicized): “Give me the frogs next to the
barn.”
Almost all children provided adult-like responses (95%), and gave all three frogs
next to the barn, i.e., they give the maximal element of the relevant set of frogs (44
adult controls selected the 3 frogs 100% of the time). Munn et al. (2006) conclude
that most children interpret PDDs correctly, i.e., maximally, and do so by at least the
age of 3. However, some issues temper this conclusion. First, and most critically,
the study did not include control trials to be sure that children would not select the
maximal set for other requests – e.g.,“Give me some of the frogs next to the barn”.
Once young children have begun collecting frogs, they may see no reason to stop at
two, the minimum required by the plural noun. Second, Munn et al.’s calculation
of 95% success did not include children who only gave one item, which is quite
clearly a failure to comprehend the maximality requirements of the PDD. When
these children are included, the total is now 85%. Finally, no breakdown by age
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is provided, so it is hard to see the progression of acquisition. It still needs to be
determined at which age – if any – children do not understand maximality in PDDs.
In a separate study, Modyanova & Wexler (2008) assess children’s interpretation
of FRs by means of a Truth-Value Judgment (TVJ) task8. Children were shown
pictures such as one in which two green apples and one red apple are under a blanket
that is partially lifted so that children can see under it, while another red apple is
completely outside the blanket.
Children were then asked a question containing a FR – e.g.,“Is what is under the
blanket red?” The authors expected the correct answer to be “no”. The FR what
is under the blanket refers to the plural individual made of two red apples and one
green apple. As such, this plural individual is not red, since an atomic part of it is
green. Instead, most children replied “yes”, regardless of age (“no” answers: 16 3- to
5-year-olds=17%; 13 6- to 8-year-olds=22%; 9 9- to 12-year-olds=33%). Crucially,
most adults also did not answer ”‘no” as predicted (22 18-24-year-olds=30%).
Therefore, based on this task, children do not interpret FRs as maximal – but neither
do adults. This result is problematic in light of speakers’ intuitions about the meaning
of FRs in many other contexts, as discussed in section 1.
Although it is possible that FRs do not actually receive a maximal interpreta-
tion, a more likely explanation of Modyanova & Wexler’s data is that the contexts
used in their TVJ task violate what Löbner (2000) and Gajewski (2005) call the
presupposition of homogeneity. When a predicate like be red – which Löbner (2000)
calls “summative” – applies to a PDD (or any other expression referring to a plural
individual), it requires that all of the atomic individuals that comprise the plural
individual be red for the sentence to be true. Similarly, it requires that none of the
atomic individuals be red in order for the sentence to be false. In any other situation
(e.g., some of the atomic individuals are red and some are green), the sentence does
not receive a truth-value. Thus, by this account, if speakers are forced to assign a
truth-value anyway, they may base responses on factors that are not related to the
semantics of maximality.
In conclusion, although two previous studies have independently examined
children’s understanding of maximal expressions – PDDs and FRs – they have done
so using two different methods, each of which presents difficulties of interpretation.
It is therefore difficult to determine when the respective forms are acquired, and
whether they exhibit similar patterns of acquisition. One of our goals is to provide
the first simultaneous study of both PDDs and FRs using the same set of methods,
to allow a direct comparison of results. To do so, we tested children using both the
Truth-Value Judgment and Act-Out tasks. Another goal was to provide something
that is still missing from the studies above: an assessment of the age at which
8 See Flynn & Foley 2004 for children’s acquisition of FRs as syntactic objects.
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children acquire maximality associated with PDDs and FRs.
3 Experiments
3.1 Experiment 1: Truth-Value Judgment Task
The purpose of our first experiment was to assess children’s maximal interpretations
of PDDs and FRs using a task similar to that of Modyanova & Wexler’s (2008)
task. We introduced a character (Cookie Monster) who loves cookies but strongly
dislikes onions, and asked children questions such as “Does Cookie Monster like
the things on the plate?” or “Does Cookie Monster like what’s on the plate?”. We
contrasted children’s interpretation of PDDs and FRs with control items, including
the quantified nominals some of the things and all the things, and the numeral one –
e.g., “Does Cookie Monster like one of the things on the plate?”.
3.1.1 Methods
Participants. We tested 69 children ages 4 to 7. There were 19 4-year-olds (m=4;7,
range: 4;0–4;11), 17 5-year-olds (m=5;8, range: 5;1–5;11), 20 6-year-olds (m=6;5,
range: 6;0–6;11), and 13 7-year-olds (m=7;4, range: 7;1–7;8). Families were
recruited by phone or through daycares in the greater San Diego area. We also tested
sixteen undergraduates at The University of California, San Diego, who participated
for course credit.
Materials and Procedure. The experimenter first presented participants with a
color picture of Sesame Street’s Cookie Monster. Participants were asked, “Do you
know who this is? This is Cookie Monster! Do you know what Cookie Monster
loves to eat?” When the participant responded “cookies”, the experimenter presented
a picture of a single chocolate chip cookie and said, “That’s right! Cookie Monster
loves cookies. Here is a cookie!” The experimenter also told participants, “Do you
know what Cookie Monster really does not like? Cookie monster does not like
onions,” and children were shown a picture of an onion. Children were asked to
label both the cookie and the onion, and identify which food Cookie Monster liked,
and which he did not like. Once the experimenter was confident that a child could
identify both cookies and onions and knew Cookie Monster’s preferences, he or she
began the experimental trials.
Participants were given 15 trials. On each trial the experimenter presented a
picture of a plate with 6 objects (all cookies, all onions, or half cookies and half
onions) in front of the child. For each picture, participants received 5 different
question trials: a FR trial (“Does Cookie Monster like what’s on this plate?”), a PDD
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trial (“Does Cookie Monster like the things on this plate?”), two quantifier control
trials (“...all the things...” and “...some of the things...”) and one numerical control
trial (“...one of the things...”). Trials were presented in two quasi-random orders,
with no two trials occurring consecutively in which the same picture was shown or
the same question was asked.
3.1.2 Results
For control trials, children and adults responded similarly. Across questions and
age groups, children correctly responded “no” to 97.3% of questions about the plate
with 6 onions, while adults said “no” 95% of the time. Similarly, children correctly
replied “yes” to 86.1% of questions about the plate with 6 cookies, while adults said
“yes” 90% of the time. Repeated measures ANOVAs of each plate type showed no
main effect of age (ps > 0.05) and no interaction of age and question type (ps > 0.1).
The remaining analyses focus on the critical mixed plate trials.
Figure 1 Percent of participants in each age group who said “no” to each question
on the Truth-Value Judgment task. Error bars represent standard error.
Figure 1 shows participants’ responses to critical trials, on which mixed sets were
presented (i.e., cookies and onions). A 5(Question Type) X 5(Age Group) repeated
measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of Question Type, (F(4,304) =
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70.1, p < 0.001), but no main effect of Age Group (p = 0.778). There was also a
significant interaction between Question Type and Age Group (F(16,304) = 2.22,
p < 0.01). To explore the main effect of Question Type we conducted Tukey-
HSD post hoc tests, and found significant differences between all question types
(ps < .01), except for one vs. some (p = .56) and PDDs vs. FRs (p = .99). This
suggests that, overall, FRs and PDDs were interpreted maximally more frequently
than DPs with the determiners one or some, but less frequently than those with all.
However, participants’ responses to questions with FRs and PDDs were not different
from chance in most cases, making it unclear whether performance reflected true
knowledge or random guessing. On FR trials, only 5-year-olds and 7-year-olds were
statistically better than chance (1-sample t-tests, all ps > 0.05, except for 5-year-olds,
t(15) = 2.24, p < 0.05; and 7-year-olds, t(10) = 2.61, p < 0.05). On PDD trials,
only 7-year-olds (t(10) = 2.61, p < 0.05) and adults (t(15) = 2.24, p < 0.05) were
statistically above chance. We next explored the interaction of Question Type and
Age Group. Univariate ANOVAs conducted on each Question (with Age Group as a
between subjects factor for each analysis) revealed that this interaction was mediated
by an effect of Age that is only present for the one question (F(4,83) = 2.79,
p < 0.05; all other ps > 0.05). Thus, there was no evidence of age-related change
in participants’ responses to the critical FR and PDD trials, despite the appearance
of an age-related trend in the case of the PDD.
3.1.3 Discussion
These data suggest that, beginning as young as 4 years of age, children do not treat
FRs and PDDs the same as quantifiers like some. On the other hand, even adults
fail to treat FRs and PDDs as equivalent to all on this task. As with Modyanova
& Wexler’s (2008) task, it is difficult to assess children’s performance in light of
adults’ lower-than-expected performance on the task. Additionally, as acceptance
rates hover just above 50% for the critical trials until age 7, it is difficult to determine
whether younger children are interpreting these sentences maximally half the time,
or whether they are simply guessing.
The imperfect performance of adults on this task may reflect the issue discussed
in section 2 regarding the TVJ task of Modyanova & Wexler (2008). As in their
study, a violation of the presupposition homogeneity may have been triggered by
an interaction between a summative predicate and its plural individual denoting
argument, as argued by Löbner (2000) and Gajewski (2005). If the verb like that
we used in our experiments is summative with respect to its object argument –
which was realized by a PDD or a FR in our test sentences – then the presupposition
would require Cookie Monster to like all the things on the plate or none of things in
order for the answer to be question to be “yes” or “no” respectively. In any other
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circumstance, including our experimental conditions, the presupposition might be
violated, such that no true or false answer can be given to the question. Thus, our
results are consistent with the conclusion that a TVJ task does not offer a valid test
of maximality, since any critical condition that is capable of assessing maximality
will necessarily involved mixed sets in which the presupposition of homogeneity
is violated. Based on this analysis, Experiment 2 investigated a similar group of
children with PDDs, FRs, and control items using an Act-Out task.
3.2 Experiment 2: Act-Out Task
Experiment 2 tested children using an Act-Out task in which children were instructed
to give a set of objects to the experimenter. This task provides a more conservative
test of interpretation as it requires a child to interpret the sentence and to generate
sets accordingly, rather than asking them to choose between two denotations (neither
of which may actually correspond to the child’s own semantic interpretation). Addi-
tionally, we tested children with control trials including quantifiers (some, all) and
nonsense words (blick) in order to determine whether children’s behaviors reflected
true knowledge or merely random responding.
3.2.1 Methods
Participants. We tested a total of 67 children between 4 and 7 years of age.
There were 13 4-year-olds (m=4;8, range: 4;1–4;11), 19 5-year-olds (m=5;5, range:
5;0–5;11), 18 6-year-olds (m=6;5, range: 6;2–6;11) and 17 7-year-olds (m=7;5,
range: 7;0–7;11). Children were recruited by phone or through daycares in the
greater San Diego area to participate in this task. An additional 17 children were
tested but excluded from analyses for failure to complete the task (2), for giving
the same number of items on all trials (2), and for failing to give 1 item when
asked for one on control trials (13). We also tested 16 University of California San
Diego undergraduates, who participated for course credit. Children or adults who
participated in Experiment 1 were not eligible for Experiment 2.
Materials and Procedure. The experimenter placed a plastic sand bucket and a
colorful paper plate in front of the participant, and placed four pieces of plastic
fruit (an orange, an apple, a banana, and a strawberry) in each of the two locations.
Participants were told, ”In this game, I’m going to ask you to give me food from
the plate (experimenter points to plate) OR from the bucket (experimenter points to
bucket). Listen to what I ask for, and then put the food in my hands. My eyes will be
closed, so when you’re done giving me the food, say, ‘I’m done!’ ” Children were
then asked to identify the plate and the bucket. After they had identified both items
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correctly, the experimenter began the test trials. Each child was given 12 trials. Each
trial began with the experimenter making a request, and ended when the participant
said she or he was done. There were six trial types: FR trials, in which participants
were asked, “Can you give me what’s in bucket/on the plate?”, PDD trials, in which
participants were asked, “Can you give me the things in the bucket/on the plate?”,
and Control trials, in which participants were asked for “one of the things”, “some
of the things”, “blick of the things”, or “all the things” from either the bucket or the
plate. Each request type was performed on two trials: once for the plate and once for
the bucket. Trials were presented in two quasi-random orders, with the same request
never asked on consecutive trials and the same location never requested on more
than two consecutive trials.
Consistent with our concerns regarding the Munn et al. (2006) study, pilot results
showed that children who received a one trial very early in the experiment were
less likely to give all fruit from the requested location on every trial. For this
reason, the first trial in both orders was “Can you give me one of the things on the
plate?” Children received neutral feedback throughout the experiment, except after
trials where they gave fruit from the wrong location. In this case, the experimenter
reminded the child to give food from the location requested. Trials in which children
gave fruit from the wrong location were not repeated, but were excluded from
analyses.
3.2.2 Results
Figure 2 shows the percentage of trials on which participants interpreted each request
maximally (by giving all four items in the requested location). Since children who
did not give one object when asked for “one” were excluded from the study, data
for one trials were not included in analyses. A 5x5 repeated measures ANOVA
was conducted, with Question Type as a within-subjects factor and Age Group as a
between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed significant main effects of Question
Type (F(4,304) = 247.4, p < 0.001) and Age Group (F(1,76) = 780.4, p < 0.001),
and a significant interaction between Question and Age Group (F(16,304) = 13.7,
p < 0.001). Tukey-HSD post hoc tests found that, when all age groups were com-
bined, all question types were different from each other (ps < .0001), except for
blick vs. some (p = .64) and PDDs vs. FRs (p = .85). One-way ANOVAs found
no differences between age groups for blick or all trials, but found that maximal
responses decreased with age for some (driven by a difference between 4-year-olds
and all other groups) and increased significantly for FRs and PDDs. For PDDs,
responses of adults, 6- and 7-year-olds were not significantly different from each
other but the responses of each group differed significantly from those of 4- and
5-year-olds (ps < 0.05). The difference between 4- and 5-year-olds was not signifi-
517
I. Caponigro, L. Pearl, N. Brooks, and D. Barner
Figure 2 Percent of participants who give all objects for each request on the
Act-Out task, by question and age group. Error bars represent standard
error.
cant. On FR trials, adults and 7-year-olds did not differ from each other but differed
from 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds (ps < 0.05).
3.2.3 Discussion
Results from the Act-Out task indicate a developmental progression in which young
children (4- and 5-year-olds) do not initially interpret FRs and PDDs maximally, but
begin to do so by 6 or 7 years of age, at which point their responses are similar to
those of adults. The strong correlation between responses for these two expressions
suggests that children acquire maximal interpretations for both expressions around
the same time.
Children and adults were much less equivocal in their interpretations of FRs
and PDDs in the Act-Out task than the TVJ task. While the TVJ results suggested
that even adults do not always interpret FRs and PDDs maximally, the Act-Out task
clearly shows that in a situation where they are prompted to act on their interpretation,
adults and older children have a strong preference for the maximal interpretation.
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4 Children’s exposure to maximal expressions: a corpus analysis
Our experimental results suggest that young children do not initially believe that
PDDs and FRs refer to maximal individuals. Instead, this knowledge emerges for
both expressions simultaneously around ages 6-7. Below, we explore whether this
behavior can be easily explained by accounts based solely on children’s input for
these expressions. These accounts would view PDDs and FRs as separate linguistic
phenomena with no underlying commonality. As such, the observed simultaneous
emergence of both constructions would need to be correlated with input frequency in
some way, such that both constructions have similar frequencies in children’s input.
Table 1 displays the results of a corpus analysis of child-directed speech portions
of several naturalistic corpora from the American English section of the CHILDES
database (MacWhinney 2000): Bates, Brown, Gleason, Hall, Kuczaj, Valian, Van-
Houten, and VanKleeck. This aggregated corpus contains 1,162,984 words and
comprises speech directed at 198 children between the ages of 2 and 5 years old9.
Overall, the table shows a marked difference in overall frequency for the two
relevant expressions (PDDs: 4749 vs. FRs: 606), which seems to immediately rule
out a simple frequency-based account for explaining the observed simultaneous
acquisition. However, it is possible that children might use frequency information in
a more sophisticated manner.
DPs Definite-DPs PDDs
138609 39179 4749
WH-clauses Embedded WH-clauses FRs
29185 10548 606
Table 1 Analysis of children’s input. DPs = all determiner phrases, either singular or plural.
PDDs = all plural DPs that are a definite description (i.e., they are prefaced by the
definite determiner the). WH-clauses = all clauses headed by a wh-word. Emb
WH-clauses = all subordinate clauses headed by a wh-word. FRs = all free relative
clauses.
Another possible account, for instance, is that children learn the correct in-
terpretation for PDDs and FRs simultaneously because they track the semantic
interpretations of key words associated with these expressions, namely the for PDDs
and wh-words like what for FRs. Whenever these key words are encountered, chil-
dren observe whether the expression they are a part of – PDDs or FRs – refers to
the maximal element of a given set. This account predicts that the is part of an
expression associated with a maximal element as frequently as wh-words are part of
an expression associated with a maximal element.
9 The breakdown of the input by age exhibits the same trend and is therefore omitted.
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We see from Table 1 that whenever the occurs at the beginning of a plural DP,
the is part of an expression referring to a maximal element 100% of the time (4749
out of 4749). In contrast, wh-words are part of expressions referring to the maximal
element of a given set much less often - only 60610 out of 29185 (2.1%) or out of
10548 (5.7%) if we restrict the relevant comparison set to embedded wh-clauses
(since FRs are embedded wh-clauses). Clearly, the synchronized emergence of PDDs
and FRs cannot be explained by an equal frequency of specific associated key words
to denote maximal elements since these frequencies differ.
While we do not discount the possibility of some additional acquisition account
based solely on input frequency that can explain the observed acquisition trajectory,
the above accounts do not seem able to. These accounts viewed PDDs and FRs
as separate linguistic phenomena with no real connection – both of them having a
maximal interpretation was simply happenstance. As such, the only way to explain
the simultaneous acquisition of the semantic interpretation was through similar input
frequencies of some kind. The input frequencies for these expressions instead appear
to be quite different. Given this, we believe it is more likely that something else
is responsible for the synchronous emergence of the semantic representations for
PDDs and FRs.
5 Discussion: A linguistically-informed acquisition account and implications
for semantic theory
Our experimental findings show that children treat PDDs and FRs as semantically
the same very early (4 years old), though they learn these expressions refer to the
maximal element of a given set much later (6-7 years old). When we conducted a
corpus analysis and examined several different acquisition accounts that viewed these
expressions as unrelated, we found that none seemed capable of explaining children’s
observed acquisition behavior. The semantic analysis and the syntax/semantics
mapping discussed in section 1 may offer a more viable explanation of these results.
Suppose that 4-year-olds master the compositional mechanism that is responsible
for mapping the underlined NP in the DP the things on the plate onto the set of indi-
viduals. This assumption is supported by children being able to correctly understand
other expressions containing that plural NP like the universally quantified DP all
the things on the plate. Suppose also that they master the (different) compositional
mechanism that is responsible for mapping the CP of a FR like what is on the plate
10 We note that the table presents an upper estimate on maximal FRs, since not all expressions matching
the observable string pattern of FRs have a maximal interpretation, e.g. He went [FR where no one
had gone before] (cf. Caponigro 2004 for additional discussion on this point). FRs using the wh-word
what usually do not have this problem, so a conservative estimate of the FRs for this dataset would be
459.
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onto a set of individuals. Finally, suppose that children do not know that the overt
definite determiner the in PDDs or the silent operator in FRs apply to those sets
to return their maximal element, maybe because children do not know that there
are sets of individuals containing plural individuals including the maximal element
(we return to this issue below). Then, children would end up with a set-denoting
expression as the argument of a predicate that selects for an individual-denoting
expression - a semantic-type mismatch that could prevent the semantic computation
from proceeding for both expressions11.
To solve this problem to PDDs and FRs, children may look for a solution that
will work for both expressions, perhaps in the form of a semantic operation that will
repair this type mismatch. Children could then look to the input for what this repair
option might be and what semantic interpretation is associated with it. Informative
data can come from either PDDs or FRs, since the same repair option with the same
interpretation is associated with each.
This account predicts that children should have the same intuitions about the
interpretations for PDDs and FRs at all ages - even if their intuitions are not correct -
because PDDs and FRs are connected by this common semantic representation issue.
Our experimental results showed this: At every age, children seem to have identical
interpretations for PDDs and FRs, even if their interpretations are not correct. This
account also predicts simultaneous acquisition of the correct interpretation for these
expressions, even if the input frequencies of these expressions are very different.
Unlike the acquisition accounts considered in the previous section, this accords with
our experimental results and corpus analysis.
But why do children not know before age 6 that the in PDDs and the silent
operator in FRs are there to turn the set into its maximal element and therefore solve
the type mismatch? Given the amount of input data available, we might expect them
to acquire the correct interpretations earlier.
A possible answer concerns children’s understanding of plural individuals.
Huntley-Fenner (1995: Ch.4) demonstrates that 4-year-old children struggle with
other expressions associated with the maximal element of a given set: collective
nouns (e.g., they are unable to treat family as a countable unit, instead counting mem-
bers of the family). We can imagine at least three hypotheses compatible with this
behavior that bear on children’s struggle with maximal individuals. First, perhaps
children do not yet have the concept of plural individuals, which means they cannot
11 Children may then adopt various strategies to deal with this mismatch, not necessarily rooted in
grammatical principles. Young children seem to treat PDDs and FRs the same as DPs with a nonsense
determiner like blick. These are interesting issues that require further investigation. Our main concern
here is just that the syntax/semantics mechanism in the grammar that children already master brings
them to the same semantic conclusion: both PDDs and FRs denote a set of individuals and both
trigger a type-mismatch.
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conceive of a maximal individual. Alternatively, they may know that there are plural
individuals, but lack the knowledge that there are linguistic expressions that refer
to those individuals. Thus, they would be unable to map any plural individual to a
linguistic expression. Another option is that children’s knowledge deficit is specifi-
cally about maximal individuals. They may not know that, given a set of individuals,
the maximal element of that set is defined and there are linguistic expressions that
refer to it. Each of these hypotheses should be tested separately, if possible, and
predictions should be carefully investigated - and we leave that to future exploration.
In conclusion, we believe that our acquisition findings are both compatible with
– and indeed support – the view that the meaning of PDDs and FRs is the same,
resulting from similar general semantic principles. More broadly, we hope to have
shown how experimental and corpus analysis techniques can inform semantic theory.
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